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Probative	Blindness	and!False	
Assurance!about	Safety!
Andrew Rae and Rob Alexander 
Abstract	
Safety activities may provide assurance of safety even where such assurance is unwarranted. 
This phenomenon Ð which we will call Òprobative blindnessÓ Ð is evident both in hindsight 
analysis of accidents and in the daily practice of safety work. The purpose of this paper is to 
describe the phenomenon of probative blindness. We achieve this by distinguishing probative 
blindness from other phenomena, identifying historical instances of probative blindness, and 
discussing characteristics and causes associated with these instances. The end product is an 
explanation of the features of probative blindness suitable for investigating the probative 
value of current safety activities, and ultimately for reducing the occurrence of probative 
blindness.  
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1 Introduction	to	Probative	Blindness	
Not all Òsafety activitiesÓ have a positive effect on safety. Some activities neither reduce the 
risk of harm associated with a system, nor provide more accurate understanding of that risk. 
These activities have no safety value. Worse, if these activities are believed to be effective, 
they result in false assurance Ð unjustified confidence that safety goals have been met.  
 
Safety activities perform three main roles, where any given activity can fill more than one 
role. ÒEnsuranceÓ is the direct improvement of the safety of systems or operations. An 
example of an ensurance-focused activity is changing a design by adding diverse means of 
performing a safety function. ÒAssessmentÓ improves knowledge about safety. Quantitative 
Risk Assessment is the stereotypical assessment technique Ð it does not directly make a 
system safer, but is supposed to inform ensurance effort (Apostolakis 2004) and thus 
indirectly improve safety. ÒAssuranceÓ is the demonstration of safety, often directed towards 
increasing the confidence of stakeholders not directly involved in ensurance and assessment. 
As with assessment, assurance does not directly make a system safer, but efforts to 
demonstrate safety may lead ultimately to safety improvement. For example, attempting to 
construct a formal proof that a design meets its safety requirements may expose ambiguity in 
the requirements or bugs in the design.  
 
Assessment and assurance are closely linked. The difference between determining safety and 
demonstrating safety is subtle, with the terms ÒassessmentÓ and ÒassuranceÓ often used 
interchangeably. Regulatory approaches typically assume that an activity that demonstrates 
safety would equally reveal danger if such danger was present (Menon,	Hawkins,	and	
McDermid	2009). Where this is not the case the activity is an instance of Òprobative 
blindnessÓ (Rae	et	al.	2014).  
 
Any safety technique, applied in the wrong way or under the wrong circumstances, can 
exhibit probative blindness. Hence, probative blindness is a property of activities; it applies to 
particular executions of a technique by particular people at a particular time.   
 
An activity is defined as exhibiting probative blindness if it provides stakeholders with 
subjective confidence in safety disproportionate to the knowledge it provides about real 
problems. 
 
There are often multiple opportunities to identify and mitigate hazards, so isolated instances 
of probative blindness are not necessarily catastrophic. When an organisation is prone to 
probative blindness, however, its beliefs about safety may drift away from reality even as 
great effort is expended on safety activities. This is why probative blindness is of such 
concern Ð it involves substantial wasted effort, and it can actively hide problems. Probatively 
blind activities can engage skilled people in enthusiastically doing things that increase the risk 
of harm. This is a particularly galling misuse of good engineers with good intentions. A better 
understanding of the phenomenon is necessary if we are to build organisations that can select, 
apply and interpret safety activity to align beliefs about safety with safety reality.  
 
In order to learn about probative blindness, we need a research approach matched to the 
current maturity of our understanding. Moving ahead too quickly Ð developing sophisticated 
theoretical models of loosely defined phenomena Ð can be unhelpful. Before a phenomenon 
such as probative blindness can be theorised, it must first be distinguished and explored (von 
Krogh, Rossi-Lamastra, and Haefliger 2012). 
 
This paper presents a case study series designed to characterise historical instances of 
probative blindness. The case studies show how probative blindness can be distinguished 
from other phenomena, and provide an initial characterisation of the manifestations and 
causes of probative blindness. 
  
The paper argues that probative blindness is a distinct and recognisable phenomenon, 
illustrates the features by which probative blindness can be recognised, and suggests how the 
causes of probative blindness can be investigated further.  
2 Distinguishing	Probative	Blindness	as	a	Phenomenon	
2.1 Belief-shifts	have	a	central	role	in	accident	theory	
 
Organisational accident theory suggests that accident prevention hinges on early recognition 
that a dangerous situation is developing. In other words, there needs to be a shift from 
believing that the situation is ÒsafeÓ to believing that the situation is ÒunsafeÓ. The reasons 
behind this lack of belief-shift become a central theme of the accident narratives. For 
example, Weick (1993) described the deaths of thirteen fire jumpers in the Mann Gulch fire in 
terms of their understanding about how dangerous the fire was. Early impressions that it was 
a fire that could be extinguished by the next morning were reinforced by the actions of their 
team leaders. When (too late) they realised that they were in imminent danger, team co-
ordination and trust collapsed. In the wake of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Depot 
(Buncefield) explosion, the Health and Safety Executive criticised the operators for Ònot 
understanding the potential impact of a vapour cloud explosionÓ (Board 2006). The 
implication of this criticism was that the actual beliefs about danger differed from the 
ÒcorrectÓ beliefs about danger. The Royal Commission into the West Gate Bridge collapse, in 
discussing a particularly dangerous feature of the construction method, suggested ÒNeither 
contractor É appears to have appreciated this need for great careÓ (Barber 1971). A 
dangerous situation had developed without a corresponding change in the perception of risk.  
 
Whilst individual accident reports will often make claims about things that Òcould have been 
knownÓ or Òshould have been knownÓ, there will always be a mismatch between what 
appears obvious in hindsight and what was actually knowable with foresight (Fischhoff 
2003).  Incorrect beliefs that appear unreasonable to investigators probably were rational to 
those with no knowledge of what was to come. Attempts to provide a general theory of 
accidents, summarised in Table 1, try to reconstruct this rationality. In particular, they offer 
explanations for how and why beliefs do not shift to match the real safety of the system 
(which would have allowed operators or designers to prevent the accident).  
 
Turner (1976) describes the pre-accident period as Òdisaster incubationÓ. During disaster 
incubation the organisation does not shift its beliefs about safety despite mounting evidence 
of problems. TurnerÕs explanation for this problem is a form of bounded rationality, where 
organisations are unable to pay attention to signals of danger. These signals are important and 
obvious in hindsight, but before the accident appear as insignificant Ð even as distractions 
from more salient concerns.  
 
Subsequent researchers have upheld TurnerÕs characterisation of the problem as a failure to 
shift beliefs, but have offered alternate explanations for how beliefs are formed, evolve, and 
are challenged within organisations.  
 
Keyser and Woods (1990) describe the problem of Òfixation errorsÓ. A fixation error involves 
a preliminary assessment of a situation that is rational given the information available at the 
time. This early assessment is not revised as new information becomes available, or even as 
the situation itself changes. Keyser and Woods provide the example of an operator ignoring 
alarms because they ÒknowÓ that the alarms are inconsistent with the ÒactualÓ state of the 
system.  
 
Vaughan (1997), explaining why the space shuttle program did not react to increasing 
evidence of danger, introduced the concept of Ònormalisation of devianceÓ. Once a particular 
warning signal has become absorbed into routine operations, further occurrences of similar 
signals have no particular salience. Instead of suggesting that the state of affairs is unsafe, 
they are part of a pattern of information associated with a normal, presumed safe situation.  
 
ÒNormal AccidentsÓ, written by Perrow (1999) in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident, 
suggests that the complexity of interaction between human and technical systems can render 
the current state of the combined human-technical system incomprehensible. People form 
flawed mental models of the system, and then interpret new information (which could have 
vital safety insights) to fit those models; they are unlikely to quickly update the models 
themselves in the midst of an emerging dangerous situation.  
 
Kewell (2007) points to the role of reputation as a two-way Òcloaking deviceÓ, both 
concealing risk from outsiders and preventing insider awareness of danger. Strong existing 
beliefs, constructed through a process of public relations, institutionalisation and 
mystification, are resilient to new information, particularly when the source of that 
information is less socially powerful.  
 
ÒHigh Reliability OrganisationsÓ (La Porte 1996) suggests that organisations are safest when 
they focus on Òevidence that contradictsÓ and eschew hierarchical authority in factor of 
operational knowledge.  
 
Table 1: Accident Theories Involving Belief-Shift 
Theory Author(s) Primary Concerns 
Disaster Incubation Turner, Pidgeon Bounded rationality, particularly for 
leadership attention and decision making 
Fixation Errors Keyser & Woods Situation assessment by operational staff 
Normalisation of 
Deviance 
Vaughan Differentiating warning signs from routine 
events at all levels of the organisation 
Normal Accidents Perrow Situation assessment by operational staff 
Reputation Kewell Interactions between staff with different 
levels of authority 
High Reliability 
Organisations 
La Porte, Weick, 
Rochlin, Roberts 
Operational decision making 
 
All of these theories make the counter-factual claim that accidents could be prevented if only 
organisations were better at updating their beliefs. Failure to do so is explained in terms of 
properties of the organisations Ð structures, attitudes, technologies, and reputations Ð but the 
theories do not directly examine the events in which beliefs fail to shift.  
2.2 Probative	blindness	is	one	of	several	belief-shift	phenomena	
 
Probative blindness is not intended to be a new theory of organisational accidents. Instead, it 
is a clarification of one of the phenomena that must be explained by organisational accident 
theories. Organisation-level properties Ð structures, attitudes, technologies and reputations Ð 
give rise to specific events in the lead up to accidents. Accident theories, whilst they try to 
explain pre-accident events, seldom consider the individual events themselves in detail, 
preferring to focus on organisation-level theories.  
 
The purpose of theories is to Òpredict and explain phenomenaÓ (Bogen and Woodward 1988). 
Theories that explain the major phenomenon of organisational accidents do so by describing 
smaller phenomena as symptoms of organisation-level properties, and drawing causal 
relations between these properties and the accidents. Unfortunately, new theories often 
introduce different labels to describe or categorise previously described phenomena, 
rendering the phenomena less distinct. Von Krogh (2012) suggests that organisational 
research is prone to such Òearly over-theorisingÓ, attempting to explain and link phenomena 
before they have been adequately described. This leads to confusion as phenomena are 
described through different theoretical lenses, disguising and blurring the boundaries of the 
phenomena themselves.  
 
We hope to avoid this fate for probative blindness by clearly delineating its boundaries. Other 
pre-accident phenomena Ð such as absent safety activities or beliefs that are held by one 
organisation but not by another Ð warrant similar treatment, but are not the topic of this paper.  
The definition of probative blindness is: 
An activity that provides stakeholders with subjective confidence in safety 
disproportionate to the knowledge it provides about real problems. 
 
There are three elements to this definition. Probative blindness requires: 
 
1. a specific safety activity, conducted at a particular time; 
2. an intent or belief that the activity provides new information about safety; and 
3. no change in organisational belief about safety as a result of the activity.  
 
2.2.1 A	specific	safety	activity	
Organisations use a range of techniques such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to form and 
update their safety beliefs. Each activity Ð each particular instance when such a technique is 
applied - is capable of updating or not updating beliefs. Any activity that purports to provide 
information about safety, but does not change organisational beliefs about safety exhibits 
probative blindness.  
 
Probative blindness is an outcome of activities rather than of techniques, organisations, or 
products. Of course, some techniques may be more likely to lead to probative blindness than 
others, and some organisations may be more prone to probative blindness. If so, these are 
causes of probative blindness, not the phenomenon itself.  
 
2.2.2 An	intent	or	belief	that	the	activity	provides	new	information	about	safety	
Many activities were never intended to change beliefs. We will use the broader category 
Ònon-probativeÓ to encompass such activities. Most ensurance activities Ð those that seek to 
improve safety by directly modifying systems Ð have no probative intent (although in practice 
they tend to increase confidence of safety). Safety promotion activities (e.g. poster and 
training campaigns) fall into this category unless they also influence the beliefs of key 
decision makers. ÒNon-probativeÓ is thus not, in itself, a pejorative term; it is only so when it 
is applied to an activity that is intended to be probative. This difference in intent makes Ònon-
probativeÓ a neutral observation about an activity, and Òprobative blindnessÓ a judgement of 
failure.  
 
Failure to update beliefs is not, by itself, probative blindness, because this failure could also 
come about through a lack of any safety activity. Activities that were never conducted cannot, 
by definition, be non-probative. Whilst there are accident narratives in which necessary safety 
activities were absent, this is a separate phenomenon from probative blindness.  
 
Probative blindness may thus be confused with lack of willingness or effort to engage in 
safety activities. Whilst Turner (1976) explicitly prescribes safety analysis as a solution to 
cultural blindness,  many major accidents are preceded by substantial safety management 
activity, including voluminous risk analysis. For example, prior to the Challenger explosion 
there was no reluctance within NASA to spend substantial effort on identifying and managing 
safety issues, but a strong reluctance to believe that there were real safety problems. 
(Vaughan 2004). 
 
Probative blindness and absent safety activity are different phenomena that may appear in the 
same organisations and accident narratives. Within organisations that pay little attention to 
safety, some activities may be missed, and other activities that are performed may have low 
status or be under-resourced, leading to probative blindness.  
2.2.3 No	change	in	organisational	belief	
Organisational beliefs, for the purpose of defining probative blindness, are those that 
influence the behaviour of key decision makers. Examples of beliefs relevant to safety are: 
 
¥ the overall level of safety of a physical system; 
¥ the success with which a particular hazard has been mitigated; 
¥ the risk associated with an operation; and 
¥ the likelihood of a particular catastrophic event.  
 
Correct beliefs (recognising that a safe system is safe, or appreciating the true amount of risk) 
are of course a good thing to have. Probative blindness is dangerous because it can lead to 
false beliefs. However, defining probative blindness in terms of correctness of belief is not 
useful, because the correctness or otherwise of beliefs about safety can usually only be judged 
in hindsight. Instead, we define it by the inability of an activity to cause any change in belief, 
whether in a more or less accurate direction. In practice, of course, we are indeed most 
concerned about beliefs that turn out to be dangerously wrong.  
 
2.3 Probative	blindness	can	be	identified	retrospectively	
 
In order to identify probative blindness, it is necessary to specify where organisational beliefs 
exist, and how changes in these beliefs can be observed. Often it is not the beliefs of the 
people directly performing the safety activity that matter, but the beliefs of those responsible 
for making decisions about designs and operations. These people receive and interpret the 
outputs of the safety activities, and it is their beliefs as decision makers that are relevant for 
identifying probative blindness. 
 
After an accident, all evidence is interpreted with the benefit of hindsight. The two main types 
of evidence about beliefs are pre-accident actions (as recorded or related by witnesses) and 
post-accident testimony directly about beliefs. Testimony about beliefs is subject not only to 
hindsight bias, but also to rationalisation, as witnesses reconcile their pre-accident and post-
accident beliefs. Both ÒI should have knownÓ and ÒI could not have knownÓ say more about 
the state of mind of the witness after the accident than before it.  
 
Actions can provide more direct evidence of belief, but only if the researchers discard the 
possibility of wilful negligence. By definition, negligence involves action or inaction that is 
unreasonable in a particular situation. There is no way for hindsight of the actions alone to 
distinguish between reasonable behaviours based on incorrect beliefs, and unreasonable 
behaviours based on correct beliefs.  
 
Characterising belief-shift through hindsight requires three things. Firstly, there must be a 
working assumption that people acted reasonably based on the beliefs that they held. 
Secondly, they must have exhibited behaviour that is consistent with one set of beliefs and 
inconsistent with alternative beliefs. Thirdly, this behaviour must have left an evidence trail 
accessible to researchers. These conditions will not be true in all cases, even where probative 
blindness existed. However, they are present often enough to allow useful research into the 
phenomenon.  
3 Examples	of	Probative	Blindness	
3.1 Method	for	identifying	probative	blindness	in	accident	narratives	
Our project used a set of four case studies, where each case study was a single major accident. 
We selected these according to whether existing narratives of the accident include beliefs 
about safety as a significant factor in the period leading up to the disaster. The source material 
varied for each case study, but in each case included at least one official accident report, 
along with supporting documents such as interview transcripts and pre-accident safety 
analyses.  
 
Within each case study we constructed a list of safety activities from the case study 
documents, and collated all mentions of each activity. We then used an alternate theoretical 
templates method, as described by Yin (2003), to determine whether each activity was an 
instance of probative blindness. This method matches case study observations to patterns of 
predictions associated with different theories or phenomena. Our intent in this study was to 
find safety activities that matched probative blindness but did not match other phenomena.  
 
In order to follow this approach, it was necessary to make use of a number of auxiliary 
hypotheses. These are contestable statements that cannot be resolved within the study (given 
the methods we are using and the focus of our attention).  
 
1. Accidents have proximate causal factors (PCFs) that existed within the system or 
organisation prior to the accident. 
2. Prior to each accident, the organisation had collective beliefs about the existence and 
severity of the PCFs. 
3. Hindsight after the accident provided improved knowledge about the existence and 
severity of the PCFs.    
 Further justification for these hypotheses will not be provided in this paper. They are 
necessary for any hindsight analysis of accidents (although seldom stated explicitly).  
 
The definition of probative blindness from Section 2.2 requires: 
¥ a specific safety activity, conducted at a particular time; 
¥ an intent or belief that the activity provides new information about safety; and 
¥ no change in organisational belief about safety as a result of the activity.  
 
Additionally, for the purpose of this study we required that the activity was linked in the case 
study documents to a proximate causal factor for the accident.  
 
The alternate templates we used were: 
 
Activity not performed: Some activities described in accident reports are counterfactual Ð 
they are notable because they did not happen. In some cases they were required by standards 
or by simple good practice; in other cases, they were not explicitly required, but with the 
benefit of hindsight itÕs clear that they might have revealed important information. 
Counterfactual activities within the case studies were identified by direct reference to the fact 
that they did not take place, or by consistent reference to them as hypothetical activities 
(language such as ÒshouldÓ, ÒwouldÓ, and ÒifÓ used with reference to the activity taking 
place).  
 
Neither blind nor safe: Some activities generate belief shift, but the beliefs do not translate 
into effective responses. In these instances, the activity may still be described as ÒineffectiveÓ 
but the failure comes through ability or willingness to act, not through a lack of awareness. 
These activities were classified by finding language or actions subsequent to the activity that 
indicated increased awareness of the PCF.  
 
Not intended to be probative: Some accident reports document activities that were not 
intended to be probative at the time they were performed. They may still in hindsight be 
labelled as Òmissed opportunitiesÓ, but there is no direct evidence that there was intent or 
belief on the part of those who commissioned or performed the activity that it was capable of 
revealing a PCF. This template did not apply if the sole reason that an activity was expected 
to find nothing was that there was a belief that there was nothing to find, i.e. where the 
activity was expected to be probative and to legitimately reveal that there were indeed no 
problems. 
 
Irrelevant: Accident reports occasionally discuss activities that are relevant for safety, but 
irrelevant for the particular accident that occurred. Such activities are used, for example, to 
indicate a generally good or generally poor standard of safety within the organisation.  
 
By sequentially applying these templates to each activity, we were able to eliminate activities 
that had interpretations other than probative blindness. As shown in Table 2, the four alternate 
templates ÒActivity not performedÓ, ÒNeither blind nor safeÓ, ÒNot intended to be probativeÓ 
and ÒIrrelevantÓ are each orthogonal to ÒProbative blindnessÓ on exactly one criterion, which 
allowed us to match each safety activity to a unique template.  
 
Table 2: Criteria Matching Alternate Templates 
 Specific activity 
performed 
Intended to be 
probative 
No change in 
belief 
Linked to 
accident 
Activity not 
performed 
NO YES YES YES 
Neither blind YES YES NO YES 
nor safe 
Not intended to 
be probative 
YES NO YES YES 
Irrelevant YES YES YES NO 
 
Probative 
Blindness 
YES YES YES YES 
 
The outcome was a set of activities for each case study that matched our definition of 
probative blindness.  
 
3.2 Method	for	characterising	probative	blindness	
 
We analysed the instances of probative blindness using a variant of Grounded Theory 
analysis. Grounded Theory is a Òbottom upÓ approach to analysis of text, where the 
researchers begin by identifying and labelling (ÒcodingÓ) significant terms and ideas within 
the text. The codes are grouped into concepts, which in turn are assembled into larger 
patterns. There are several variants of Grounded Theory. Our work follows the approach of 
Corbin and Strauss (1990) who recommend a particular coding paradigm to aid with validity 
and replication. This paradigm looks for Òcausal conditionsÓ, ÒphenomenaÓ, Òintervening 
conditionsÓ, Òaction strategiesÓ, and ÒconsequencesÓ.  
 
Our interest was in the real-world events prior to the accident, not the social construction of 
reality by the investigators. We interpreted statements in the transcripts and reports as a 
straightforward representation of real-world events, and accepted at face-value causal claims 
made in the accident reports.  
 
For each activity that we had identified as probative blindness, we coded all references to that 
activity. The codes were initially terms selected directly from the text. These were grouped 
where different terms referred to the same concepts, and then structured into themes based on 
similarities between concepts.  
 
Ultimately, the themes fell into two categories: 
¥ the manifestations of probative blindness (i.e. the immediate mechanisms by which 
activity outputs fail to update beliefs) 
¥ the conditions under which probative blindness occurs (i.e. things that cause 
probative blindness) 
 
As noted above, Corbin and Strauss (1990) suggest that Grounded Theory should identify 
further categories relating to intervening conditions, action/interaction, and consequences. In 
the case of Probative Blindness, these categories would describe how the phenomenon could 
be avoided or managed. Such topics were weakly present in the accident reports, and were 
contained only in the recommendations. We decided not to focus on avoidance or 
management in this paper.  
3.3 	Case	Studies	
3.3.1 Boeing	787-8	Battery	Incidents	
On January 7, 2013, a Japan Air Lines Boeing 787-8 experienced a fire inside the Auxiliary 
Power Unit (APU) whilst parked at Logan International Airport, Massachusetts (National 
Transportation Safety Board 2014) . On January 16, 2013, an All Nippon Airways 787-8 
experienced an in-flight main battery failure, resulting in an emergency landing and 
evacuation (Japan Transport Safety Board 2014). Both events arose from a short circuit inside 
a lithium-ion battery cell, leading to thermal runaway cascading to adjacent cells.  
 
Whilst there were no injuries in the first incident, and only minor injuries in the second 
incident, the incidents revealed a potentially catastrophic failure mechanism that was not 
reflected in the aircraft safety assessment.  
 
Boeing had overall responsibility for integration and certification of the Electrical Power 
System (EPS). Thales designed the subsystem containing the main and APU batteries, which 
were supplied by GS Yuasa. Certification activities were overseen by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).  
 
The following safety activities exhibited probative blindness: 
 
Nail Penetration Test 
GS Yuasa conducted a nail penetration test in November 2006. This test involved driving a 
steel nail through one of the battery cells in order to induce a short circuit and observe the 
effects. As a result of the single documented nail penetration test, GS Yuasa concluded that a 
short circuit in a single cell would not propagate to other cells or result in a fire (a conclusion 
eventually contradicted by the incidents described above). This belief influenced both the 
design of the battery enclosure and the quantitative risk assessment for the Auxiliary Power 
Unit.  
 
Post-Assembly Inspection 
GS Yuasa conducted physical and CT scan inspections of each manufactured battery. These 
inspections were intended to detect manufacturing defects such as foreign object debris 
(FOD) and wrinkles in the cell windings. Less than one percent of batteries were rejected 
during these inspections. After the accident, National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) 
investigators found that the resolution settings on the CT scan machines were such that FOD 
and wrinkles could not be observed. Disassembly of in-service batteries during the 
investigation revealed numerous defects and variances. 
 
EPS Safety Assessment  
BoeingÕs Safety Assessment for the Electrical Power System (EPS) included a quantitative 
risk assessment for the Auxiliary Power Unit, prepared by Thales. This included Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The safety assessment 
concluded that the likelihood of a battery cell venting with smoke was less than one in ten 
billion flight hours. Both incidents above occurred during the first 52000 flight hours, 
suggesting that the actual likelihood was considerably higher.  
 
Boeing and FAA Oversight 
Compliance with the battery safety requirements was demonstrated through formal analysis 
and testing. Boeing reviewed the analysis provided by Thales and GS Yuasa, but did not 
uncover the problems with the assumption about cell propagation or the related likelihood of 
battery venting with smoke.  
 
Similarly, FAA representatives reviewed BoeingÕs complete safety analysis for the EPS 
without uncovering the problems.  
3.3.2 Deepwater	Horizon	Blowout	
The Deepwater Horizon mobile drilling rig was preparing an exploratory well at Macondo 
Prospect in the Gulf of Mexico. On 20 April 2010, as the Deepwater Horizon was preparing 
to cap and abandon the well, there was a ÒblowoutÓ Ð an uncontained release of gas and 
drilling fluid. The blowout led to an explosion that sank the Deepwater Horizon. There were 
11 fatalities, and one of the largest oil spills in history (Deepwater Horizon Study Group 
2011).  
 
Commentary on the accident has focussed on the failures of BP (owners of the Macondo 
Well) and Transocean (operators of the Deepwater Horizon) to manage the risks associated 
with a blowout. 
 
The following activities exhibited probative blindness: 
 
Cement Slurry Analysis 
The final cementing operation used nitrogen foam cement. Samples of the cement were 
laboratory tested to ensure that it had the required properties Ð including viscosity, curing 
rate, and final strength Ð under well conditions. Two tests were conducted in February, and 
two in April. The earliest three tests revealed the slurry to be unstable under the test 
conditions, but this was ascribed to problems with the tests rather than problems with the 
cement. The final test was completed only after the cement was used in the well Ð i.e., too late 
to influence decision making on the Deepwater Horizon.   
 
Negative Pressure Tests 
To verify the integrity of the cement barrier, Ònegative pressure testsÓ were conducted. These 
tests involved reducing the pressure within the drill pipe to 0 psi. If the cement barrier was 
working, it should have prevented the high hydrocarbon pressure in the rock formation 
through which the drill shaft descended forcing oil or mud into the pipe. Either a flow of 
liquid or a change in pressure would have indicated that there was seepage of fluid into the 
well, and therefore a problem with the cement barrier.  
 
The tests should have only passed if there was no flow or increase in pressure. During the first 
test, it was not possible to reduce the pressure fully in preparation for the test, and the 
pressure rose during the test. For the second and third tests the partial vacuum was 
successfully created, but the pressure increased during the test. Rather than accept that the 
tests had failed, the crew hypothesised a Òbladder effectÓ, i.e. that the drill pipe was being 
squeezed by pressure in the surrounding riser. If this were true, the increasing pressure would 
not have indicated a failed cement barrier.  
 
A revised test was conducted using the Òkill lineÓ, one of several smaller pipes used to 
circulate fluids in the well. This revised test was a valid process Ð in fact it was the procedure 
submitted in the most recent drilling permit Ð but it only made sense to perform it when the 
drill pipe and kill lines were at the same pressure. The drill pipe started and remained at high 
pressure throughout the test, indicating that the integrity of the cement barrier was 
compromised. Nevertheless, the crew interpreted the constant low pressure in the kill line as a 
successful test, and evidence of the integrity of the cement barrier.  
 
Blowout Preventer (BOP) Safety Analysis  
The blowout preventer was subject to intensive safety analysis. The control system alone was 
the subject of a 472 page quantitative risk assessment (EQE International 2000). A detailed 
analysis of the blowout released in June 2014 determined that the true cause of BOP failure 
(the pipe was hard to shear due to buckling) was not only not considered in the risk 
assessment, but was likely to be missing from most analyses of similar systems (U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 2014). TransoceanÕs Major Hazard Risk 
Assessment for Deepwater Horizon showed a clear belief in the efficacy of the blowout 
preventer (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 2014). 
3.3.3 Space	Shuttle	Columbia	Explosion	
The Columbia accident occurred on flight STS-107, February 1 2003. During ascent, a large 
piece of insulation foam, the Left Bipod Foam Ramp, was shed from the external fuel tank 
and struck the leading edge of the orbiter wing. This damaged the Thermal Protection System, 
the heat-resistant tiles intended to protect the orbiter during re-entry to the atmosphere. 
Despite some concern during the mission, it was judged safe to attempt a landing, during 
which the orbiter disintegrated.  
 
The original design requirement for the shuttle was that debris should not shed from the 
external tank at all. During the very first Columbia flight, which was the first flight of any 
shuttle, large amounts of debris were observed. On flights STS-7, STS-32R, STS-50 and 
STS-112 the Left Bipod Foam Ramp was observed as debris. Not all of these flights involved 
Columbia, but all involved the same design of external tank.  
 
Throughout the shuttle program numerous safety assessments were conducted which served 
to alleviate, rather than reinforce, concern about the foam debris in general, and the Left 
Bipod Foam Ramp in particular.  
 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (2003) contains some language that 
supports the Òneither blind nor safeÓ interpretation of these assessments, suggesting an 
irresponsible acceptance of known risk rather than a failure to update beliefs. However, there 
is no direct evidence in the report or the accompanying documents to match this template. 
The outcome from each activity listed here was renewed confidence that the risk from foam 
debris was low, and that the shuttle was fundamentally safe.  
 
The following activities exhibited probative blindness: 
 
STS-8 Pre-Flight Review 
During flight STS-7 the Left Bipod Foam Ramp struck the Thermal Protection System. This 
event was designated after the mission as an in-flight anomaly, a classification that required 
proof that there was no threat to flight safety. The STS-8 pre-flight review that ÒresolvedÓ the 
anomaly was an instance of probative blindness. This review discussed repair of the damage, 
but did not refer to future risk.  
 
Analysis between STS-35 Post Flight and STS-36 Pre Flight Review 
After flight STS-35 considerable damage was observed to the Thermal Protection System. 
This was designated an in-flight anomaly. The anomaly was closed by the STS-36 pre-flight 
review, which stated that there was no increase in Orbiter Thermal Protection System damage 
compared to previous flights and that it was Ônot a safety-of-flight concern.Õ  
 
STS-50 and Integration Hazard Report 37 
During flight STS-50 the foam ramp detached and caused what was, at that time, the largest 
ever area of tile damage. The incident was recorded as ÒIntegration Hazard Report 37Ó, which 
was closed out as an Òaccepted riskÓ.  The close out activity is not described. It is this activity 
which exhibited probative blindness.  
 
Pre-Flight Review STS-113 
The briefing slides for STS-113 (which occurred before STS-107) discussed the foam loss on 
STS-112. These slides concluded ÒThe ET [external tank] is safe to fly with no new concerns 
(and no added risk)Ó. An accompanying report indicated a 99 percent probability of no foam 
being shed from the same area. This calculation was based on a selective sample of flights 
(i.e. it excluded several of the known Left Bipod Foam Ramp losses), inappropriately 
averaged between the left and right ramps, and assumed incorrectly that Òno recordÓ was 
positive evidence of Òno lossÓ. There were many occasions when the ramp condition was not 
observed or recorded. A review as part of the subsequent accident investigation estimated a 
10 percent probability of Left Bipod Foam Ramp loss.  
 
Debris Assessment Team during STS-107 
During the second day of the STS-107 mission, review of the launch photos revealed a debris 
strike on the left wing of the orbiter. A ÒDebris Assessment TeamÓ was formed to analyse the 
damage. This team used a modelling tool known as ÒCraterÓ to estimate the amount of 
damage from the size of the observed strike. The team requested that imagery be sought from 
outside sources to reduce the uncertainty of this estimate, but this request was not passed on. 
The Crater tool indicated that a dangerous amount of damage had occurred. However, the tool 
was believed to be conservative, and so the analysis team applied engineering judgment to 
conclude that the damage was acceptable.  
 
The Debris Assessment Team was not highly confident of their own findings, and there is 
some evidence that the uncertainty caused considerable safety concern for individuals and the 
team as a whole. Their activities, despite the problems with the tool, were locally probative. 
However, as the results were transmitted to and interpreted by the mission management team, 
the uncertainty decreased, and the analysis was used to confirm belief in the insignificance of 
the damage. The activity caused no change of belief amongst the operational decision makers. 
3.3.4 Australian	Government	Home	Insulation	Program	Deaths	
The Home Insulation Program was part of a stimulus package announced by the Australian 
government on 3 February 2009 (Hanger 2014). The program involved government-
subsidised installation of insulation into private homes. As an intended effect of the program, 
many new contractors and employees entered the home insulation industry. 
 
Between October 2009 and February 2010 four fatalities and two serious injuries occurred on 
separate projects funded by the program. All of the fatalities involved a lack of training and 
supervision for the installers, who were young men new to the insulation industry. Two of the 
fatalities were electrocutions caused by the use of metal staples in combination with reflective 
foil laminate (RFL).  
 
The following safety activities exhibited probative blindness: 
 
Industry Consultation Meeting 
A formal consultation meeting was held on 18 February 2009, between members of the 
program office and representatives of the installation industry. No representatives of electrical 
trades were included in the meeting; however, training and competency were discussed, with 
direct links drawn between training and worker safety. The specific risk of electrocution 
related to RFL was also raised. The actions arising from this meeting did not reflect any 
increased awareness of the risks on the part of the program office staff. In particular, industry 
representatives presented information regarding deaths involving RFL installation in New 
Zealand. The fact that project staff did not seek more information about these deaths after the 
meeting is a strong indication that their beliefs about the risks had not been changed by the 
information. 
 
Risk Register Preparation 
On 3 March 2009 a risk identification workshop was held by the program office. On 13 
March, Minter Ellison Consultants were appointed as external risk consultants, and a further 
risk identification workshop was held on 23 March. A draft risk management plan was 
produced on 30 March, and discussed at meetings on 31 March and 2 April. The output of 
this process was a risk register finalised on 9 April. During this same period, the Project Plan 
for the Home Insulation Program was being developed. The various versions of the Project 
Plan provide evidence of the evolution of understanding of risk within the team. Rather than 
improving understanding of safety risks, the risk workshops appear to have de-emphasised 
concerns about training, competence and workplace safety, ultimately not including these 
topics in the project risk register. The risk assessment effectively destroyed previous 
awareness of a safety issue. We might call this a case of retrograde probative amnesia.  
 
Audits and Inspections 
The audit and compliance scheme occurred in two phases. During the first phase, from the 
start of the program until October 2009, less than one percent of the installations were 
inspected. The focus was on detecting fraud rather than checking quality or safety of the 
installations, so desktop audits - examination of the paperwork - were prioritized. From 
October 2009 a new auditor was appointed, with more technical inspections, but still with a 
focus on detecting fraud and checking that homes were eligible for the program.  
 
October 2009 Briefing Notes 
After the first fatality there was a period of intense activity, including briefings for the 
responsible Minister delivered on 19 October, 21 October, and 22 October. These briefings 
specifically covered the RFL-related electrocution hazard, but recommended against 
removing RFL from the program. As with the risk register, this safety activity took as input a 
number of sources of information that clearly understood the risk, and produced outputs that 
understated and obscured the risk. Based in part on these briefings, RFL was not removed 
from the program for several months. 
4 Manifestations	of	Probative	Blindness	
The instances of probative blindness within the case studies exhibit a small number of 
observable mechanisms. These mechanisms are observable only in hindsight Ð this is not a 
spotterÕs guide that can be used to observe probative blindness as it happens Ð but we 
hypothesise that the different mechanisms may have distinctive patterns of causation that can 
ultimately be recognised and remedied before they cause a problem. Each mechanism 
operates at a different stage during the activity. The categories and subcategories of 
mechanism are shown in Error! Reference source not found. and described in sections 4.1 
to 4.4.  
 
 
Figure 1: Manifestations of Probative Blindness 
4.1 Failure	to	identify	hazards	or	to	correctly	assess	their	significance	
The first manifestation of probative blindness is Òsimple errorÓ in the conduct of safety 
analysis. The analysis has the shape and form of a correct analysis, but produces outputs that 
do not recognise or pay sufficient attention to the problem or condition which ultimately leads 
to an accident. This may be failure to identify a hazard Ð (Barton and Rae (2012) suggest that 
approximately 20% of accidents involve failure to identify hazards in circumstances where it 
would be reasonable to expect the safety activity to do so) - or mistaken belief that a hazard 
has been adequately addressed.  
 
From the case studies, this category includes: 
¥ The 787-8 nail penetration test, EPS Safety Assessment and review 
¥ The Columbia activities prior to flight STS-107 
¥ Some but not all of the Home Insulation Program industry consultations; the risk 
register preparation; and the early audits and inspections 
 
ÒSimple errorsÓ have complex causes. Whilst the mechanisms of probative blindness are 
contained within a short time frame during the conduct of the activities, the causes and 
conditions stretch well beyond. In each of these cases it is likely that different people put into 
the same situation would have exhibited the same errors.  
 
Discussion of the precise types of error that may be made during a safety analysis is beyond 
the scope of this work. For a detailed discussion see Rae, Alexander and McDermid (2014). 
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4.2 Incorrect	Attribution	of	Anomalies	
Sometimes the analysis team successfully discovers problems, but these are interpreted as 
mistakes in the safety activity. This manifestation has three subcategories.  
 
1. ÒDouble dippingÓ Ð repeating unfavourable tests until a favourable result is achieved. 
This was evident in the negative pressure tests and cement foam analysis for 
Deepwater Horizon. In each case, test failure was attributed to the test conditions 
rather than to the cement, and the test was repeated under changed conditions.  
 
2. Changing the analysis or its interpretation until it produces a favourable answer. This 
requires a known ÒacceptableÓ answer, such as risk acceptance criteria. This was 
evident in the shuttle Debris Assessment TeamÕs use of the Crater tool.  
 
ÒAgain, the tool was used for something other than that for which it was designed; 
again, it predicted possible penetration; and again, the Debris Assessment Team used 
engineering arguments and their experience to discount the results.Ó (Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board 2003, 168) 
 
In fact, the team did ignore the results Ð they decided that the tool was overly 
conservative, and produced a final damage estimate smaller than the one provided by 
the tool.  
 
3. The third subcategory is post-hoc rationalisation Ð moving the goalposts for the 
activity to judge the results to be acceptable. In these cases, if there had been 
objective criteria fixed in advance, these criteria would have demanded an 
unfavourable result.  
 
The NTSB report into the Boeing 787-8 fires bemoaned the lack of objective criteria 
for battery inspections and thermal design features (National Transportation Safety 
Board 2014, 73). The final negative pressure test on Deepwater Horizon also 
involved post-hoc rationalisation, since strict application of the test criteria would not 
have judged the test to be passed.  
4.3 Motivated	Skepticism	in	the	Interpretation	of	Bad	News	
Studies of motivated skepticism show that Òinformation consistent with a preferred 
conclusion is examined less critically than information inconsistent with a preferred 
conclusionÓ (Ditto and Lopez 1992). Whilst no-one has directly investigated motivated 
skepticism in interpreting safety information, accidents such as the Challenger explosion 
(Vaughan 1997) and the West Gate Bridge collapse (Barber 1971) involved the rejection of 
unfavourable risk assessments by applying strict standards which were not equally applied to 
favourable risk assessments. 
 
The analysis team may report unfavourable results, only to have the quality or suitability of 
the activity called into question. Critical review of safety activities is a good thing, but not if 
it is applied selectively to challenge uncomfortable results, but not confirmatory results.  
 
This category includes outright rejection of the analysis; re-interpretation of the results in a 
way not intended by those who performed the analysis; as well as seeking a second opinion, 
and giving that more weight without any technical reason to prefer it to the initial judgement; 
 
The following occurred during the space shuttle program. 
 
Rejection: 
ÒProgram managers required engineers to prove that the debris strike created a safety-of-
flight issue: that is, engineers had to produce evidence that the system was unsafe rather than 
prove that it was safeÓ (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 172) 
 
Reinterpretation:   
ÒIn all official engineering analyses and launch recommendations prior to the accidents, 
evidence that the design was not performing as expected was reinterpreted as acceptable and 
non-deviant, which diminished perceptions of risk throughout the agency.Ó (Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board 2003, 196) 
 
The evidence from the pre-flight safety review process strongly suggests that technical 
judgements were being ÒoverwrittenÓ by second opinions. This was certainly the case in the 
earlier Challenger accident (Dombrowski 1991) and is a credible explanation for the 
otherwise inexplicably Òsleight-of-handÓ (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 126) 
calculations presented at the STS-113 Pre-Flight review.  
 
4.4 Inability	to	Clearly	Communicate	Uncertainty	
The fourth type of probative blindness concerns activities which are probative in themselves, 
but where the probative value is Òlost in translationÓ. This may be the case where uncertainty 
is felt and expressed by the analysis team, but is lost through over-simplification or 
ambiguous explanation.  
 
The Home Insulation Program included numerous examples where risks were described in 
over-simplified terms, leading to misinterpretation of their intended scope. Worries about 
fraud, originally intended to include problems with competency, installation quality and 
certification, were transformed into desktop audits concerned only with financial fraud. 
Substantive discussions about safety, including the New Zealand experiences, were 
summarised in short line items about training (Hanger 2014, 93). 
 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Òfound that a large number of hazard reports 
contained subjective and qualitative judgments, such as ÒbelievedÓ and Òbased on experience 
from previous flights this hazard is an ʻAccepted RiskʼÓ. This led to an inability to share 
information about risk clearly throughout the complex organisation hierarchy (Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board 2003, 189). 
 
The board also criticised safety reports that did not include Òa quantifiable range of 
uncertainty and risk analysisÓ (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 168) Ð i.e. 
providing a range of probabilities rather than a single number. Where there were attempts to 
communicate uncertainty ÒEngineers É indicated a belief that management focused on the 
answer Ð that analysis proved there was no safety-of-flight issue Ð rather than concerns about 
the large uncertainties that may have undermined the analysis that provided that answer.Ó 
(Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 160). 
5 Conditions	under	which	probative	blindness	occurs	
In this section we offer our own thoughts, supported by themes from the case studies, for why 
probative blindness occurs. Our claims about causality, particularly since they arise from 
hindsight and re-interpretation, are presented as cautious hypotheses rather than proven 
conclusions.  
 
Any isolated instance of probative blindness, when viewed with the benefit of hindsight, 
gives the appearance of incompetence or misconduct. Instances are typically described as 
Òmissed opportunitiesÓ Ð as if an activity that could and should have been probative was 
performed inappropriately.  
 
By analysing the common conditions of a range of instances of probative blindness, however, 
our study suggests that activities that suffer probative blindness have a broader social and 
organisational role that actively subsumes and thwarts any probative potential. Whilst 
individual attitude and competence has a role to play, it is as much a symptom as it is a cause 
of probative blindness Ð individuals may have performed badly because the organisation set 
them up to do so. 
 
Most safety activities that are not direct ensurance have a dual purpose assessment / assurance 
role. Whilst the activities have names typically associated with investigation, such as 
ÒassessmentÓ, ÒanalysisÓ, and ÒtestÓ, they also serve to communicate, demonstrate and 
reinforce existing beliefs. Safety activities are risk enablers as well as risk controls.  
 
This dual purpose is normal and necessary. Communication and demonstration of safety is 
enshrined in safety regulation, and is demanded by customers and senior management. 
However, there is always a risk in this arrangement; a risk that participants lose sight of the 
fact that these activities actually could detect danger. The activities become entirely about 
assurance, and not at all about assessment. Even plans and schedules are determined on the 
assumption that the safety activities will never find problems.  
 
Each of the case studies represents a large, public, expensive endeavour. The Space Shuttle 
was the flagship of the US space program. The Home Insulation Program was intended to be 
both a major public works initiative and a response to the global financial crisis. The 787 was 
an attempt to recapture the initiative in the Airbus/Boeing struggle for domination of the 
international commercial aircraft market. Deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico was an 
ambitious use of novel technology and methods to restore US oil independence.  
 
Projects such as these have corporate and political momentum. Whilst at face value 
regulations and safety analysis exist as checkpoints and controls, in practice they are a small 
part of a large and complex project execution process. They are gears being spun by the 
project machine, rather than levers with the power to direct and halt forward progress.  
 
We make no claim that there is a causal relationship between Òlarge public projectÓ and 
probative blindness. Significant disasters were selected as our case studies because of the 
depth of investigation and the accessibility of the evidence - we did not compare probative 
blindness on large and small projects. However, these projects exaggerate and highlight the 
pressures present in all projects.  
 
When a safety activity impedes a project it is an embarrassment and a failure. It is easier for a 
safety analyst Ð particularly if inexperienced and lacking the confidence that comes with deep 
competence Ð to believe that there is a problem with the safety activity than to accept that 
there is a problem with the project. It is easier still never to find problems at all.  
 
The seven main conditions that we suggest lead to probative blindness are summarised in 
Figure 2 and elaborated in Sections 5.1 to 5.7 
 
Figure 2: Conditions that give rise to probative blindness 
 
5.1 Blindness	can	stem	from	strong	prior	belief	in	safety	
ÒBeliefÓ refers to the degree of certainty that existed prior to the safety activity. How much 
did the organisation, audience or analysis team expect the safety activity to find? Belief 
influences both the conduct and the interpretation of safety activities. When the team 
• Operational	experience	
• Reputation	
• Previous	Safety	Activities	
When	there	is	strong	prior	belief	
• Ritualisation	
• Focus	on	standards	
• Focus	on	process	
When	there	is	a	transfer	of	intent	from	safety	to	compliance	
• Demonstration	instead	of	investigation	
• Framing	of	goals	
When	success	means	not	Θinding	problems	
• Seeking	reassurance	
• Overselling	activities	
When	there	is	strong	desire	for	certainty	and	closure	
• Poor	choice	of	technique	
• Techniques	requiring	specialised	knowledge	
• DifΘiculty	Θinding	and	keeping	staff	
When	there	is	insufΘicient	capacity	to	perform	a	probative	activity	
• Lack	of	communication	
• Contractual	barriers	
When	there	is	separation	between	safety	and	design	or	operational	activities	
• Focus	on	completing	safety	tasks	
• Unwillingness	to	contradict	previous	statements	
• Lack	of	time	to	address	problems	
• CertiΘication	inertia	
When	it	is	hard	to	respond	to	any	problems	that	are	found	
conducting an activity does not expect to find problems, they are likely to conduct activities 
with mindsets and methods aimed at confirming information rather than testing it. Even 
where anomalies are found, there are always two possible explanations: either there is a 
problem with the thing being assessed, or there is a problem with the assessment. Which 
explanation is favoured is strongly influenced by which one is seen as more likely based on 
current belief, and on how acceptable each explanation is.  
 
Each of the four case studies involved safety analysis conducted with a prior expectation of 
safety. This expectation was formed from operational experience, the reputation of the team 
responsible for the system, and even from previous safety activities.  
 
At the time of the 787-8 safety assessment, GS Yuasa had over 14,000 lithium cells in 
service, all of similar design. None of these had experienced thermal runaway (National 
Transportation Safety Board 2014, 71). Armed with this ÒknowledgeÓ that thermal runaway 
was highly unlikely, only a small number of physical tests were conducted, with only one nail 
penetration test properly documented (National Transportation Safety Board 2014, 70). An 
inverted pyramid was built upon these inadequate tests. The Thales FTA and FMEA used 
(and thereby endorsed) the GS Yuasa figures. The Boeing analysis used (and thereby 
endorsed) the Thales analysis. The FAA inspectors were not reviewing the safety of the 
batteries in a vacuum, but in the context of prior findings of safety by GS Yuasa, Thales, and 
Boeing.  
 
On Deepwater Horizon, there was a ceremony aboard the rig on the day of the accident to 
celebrate seven years without a lost-time safety incident (Deepwater Horizon Study Group 
2011, 38). The foam cement analyses and negative pressure tests themselves came after 
numerous prior tests and analyses. For example, the BP Accident Investigation Report makes 
frequent reference to ÒOptiCemÓ, a software modelling tool used frequently throughout the 
placement of the cement. Whilst the limitations of this tool were recognised in hindsight, it is 
clear that significant reliance was placed on the tool during and immediately after cement 
placement. The prior findings of safety set the context for the negative pressure tests. The 
team conducting the tests believed that they were performing a routine check, and they 
expected a favourable result (BP 2010).  
 
ÒFinally, due to poor communication, it does not appear that the men performing and 
interpreting the test had a full appreciation of the context in which they were performing it. 
Such an appreciation might have increased their willingness to believe the well was flowing. 
Context aside, however, individuals conducting and interpreting the negative-pressure test 
should always do so with an expectation that the well might lack integrity.Ó (National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011, 119) 
 
When foam debris was first observed on the shuttle missions, it was classified as an Òin-flight 
anomalyÓ Ð a serious event requiring extensive investigation. By STS-107, there had been 
111 successful missions. Not only that, there had been multiple safety analyses directed 
specifically at the foam debris and tile damage issues. This created a considerable weight of 
expectation that any further analysis should reach a matching conclusion.  
 
For example, the STS-107 Flight Readiness Review was based in part on the conclusions of 
the STS-113 Flight Readiness Review. This in turn used ÒIntegration Hazard Report 37Ó, 
from STS-50 (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 126) . Rather than an in-depth 
analysis, this ÒreportÓ appears to be a line item in a hazard log concluding that the risk of 
foam debris strike was acceptable. The report was thus Òineffective as a decision aidÓ 
(Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 187). 
 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, discussing the in-flight analysis during the fatal 
mission, stated: 
ÒIt was at this point, before any analysis had started, that Shuttle Program managers 
officially shared their belief that the strike posed no safety issues, and that there was no need 
for a review to be conducted over the weekendÓ (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
2003).  
 
Whilst in fact a preliminary damage assessment was conducted the following day, it was 
conducted with a strong prior expectation that any damage was tolerable.  
 
The role of belief is less straightforward in the Home Insulation case study. There is no 
indication that there was specific belief in the safety of insulation, or in Reflective Foil 
Laminate (RFL) in particular. RFL had been banned in the New Zealand program due to 
electrocution risk, and there were numerous non-fatal electrical incidents involving insulation 
installation in the Australian state of Queensland (Hanger 2014, 76 & 195). However, 
workplace health and safety in Australia is primarily regulated at the State (regional) level, 
and there was a strong belief that existing State-based safety regulation was sufficient to 
address any safety risks. This belief framed all of the Federal Government discussions and 
assessments of safety.  
 
ÒÉ ÔassumingÕ that the States and Territories would monitor and enforce OH&S obligations, 
without taking any appropriate steps to ensure that such assumption was reasonable.Ó 
(Hanger 2014, 223) 
 
This analysis, which dismissed the risk based primarily on issues of scope and responsibility, 
was portrayed as a ÒComprehensive Risk AssessmentÓ, and used to reassure the Minister that 
the safety risk was being appropriately managed. Throughout the subsequent Royal 
Commission, representatives of Minter Ellison maintained that they were not experts in the 
risks themselves, and were merely facilitating a process where risks were identified by the 
Department. Department representatives maintained that they were not experts in the risks, 
and were engaging Minter Ellison as external experts. (Hanger 2014, 141) 
 
ÒDEWHA appointed a full-time Risk Manager for the HIP. That personÕs role was to  
coordinate and report on the risk management process and to provide feedback. The  
role was not to manage each individual risk, but rather to manage the risk framework.  
The function was primarily administrative rather than substantive risk management.Ó 
(Hanger 2014, 148) 
 
5.2 Blindness	can	stem	from	transfer	of	intent	from	safety	to	compliance	
 
ÒIntentÓ refers to the reasons why a safety activity is carried out. What did the organisation, 
audience or analysis team want from the activity? In particular, were they seeking to learn 
about safety, or to reassure themselves or others that safety already existed?  
 
If certain practices are known to improve safety, then it makes sense to require those practices 
to be performed, and to explain accidents in terms of an absence of those practices. Hence, 
there is a close link between ÒsafetyÓ Ð achieving an acceptable level of risk Ð and 
ÒcomplianceÓ Ð performing an accepted set of safety practices. Safety and compliance are 
closely linked in standards, regulation, and the approach of many organisations to safety 
(Besnard and Hollnagel 2012).  
 
However, it is much easier to demonstrate that safety activities have been conducted than to 
demonstrate that they have improved safety. This can result in a transfer of concern from 
safety towards compliance for its own sake. Often, safety activities have an explicit goal of 
compliance or regulatory approval rather than the discovery or characterisation of risk.  
Wastell (1996) describes how methods can become Òan irrational ritual, the enactment of 
which provides designers with a feeling of security É at the expense of real engagement with 
the task at handÓ.  
 
The transference of concern can be seen in management interest in the completion of risk 
activities rather than the details of the risks themselves. It can also be seen in the selection of 
specific activities based on regulations and standard practices rather than on a match between 
the activity and the risk under investigation.  
 
The word ÒcomplianceÓ occurs 58 times in the NTSB report on the January 2013 Boeing 787-
8 fire (compared to 18 mentions for the work ÒriskÓ). Almost all mentions refer to activities 
that were found to be compliant before the accident, but with the benefit of hindsight were 
inadequate.  
 
ÒCritical assumptions and conclusions made in GS YuasaÕs and ThalesÕ safety analyses and 
used in BoeingÕs EPS safety assessment were not fully delineated and justified with 
appropriate data and engineering rationale. However, multiple independent reviews of the 
EPS safety assessment by Boeing authorized representatives and FAA certification engineers 
did not reveal these deficiencies.Ó (National Transportation Safety Board 2014, 72)  
 
Concern with risk management processes (rather than the risks themselves) was also evident 
in the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program. 
 
ÒMR WILSON: Did you thinkÑdidnÕt you think you should find out what the residual risk 
was and how high it was?  
 
[MINISTER]: No, I didnÕt because thereÕs a sentence that follows that which refers to what 
was being proposed to particularly manage those risks.  
 
MR WILSON: But in order to make sure that whatÕs said in that sentence came to pass didnÕt 
you need to know what the residual risks were?  
 
[MINISTER]: Well, that would be a matter for my Department and advisors to highlight for 
me if they determined it to be necessary. It would also be a matter for me to enquire for if I 
determined it to be necessary, but on the basis of this brief and the way in which this brief 
was expressed, no.Ó (Hanger 2014, 122) 
 
The Deepwater Horizon negative pressure tests were the sole activity conducted to test the 
integrity of the cement barrier. Additional techniques were available, in particular a Òcement 
bond logÓ (CBL). A CBL team was standing-by on the drilling platform, but was flown back 
to shore after a decision was made to proceed with negative pressure tests only. This decision 
was made based on a pre-determined decision tree outlining the circumstances under which 
each activity would be performed (Deepwater Horizon Study Group 2011). The decision tree 
was in theory risk-based, but was too generic to consider all of the local conditions. Concern 
was transferred from selecting techniques based on indications of risk, to selecting them 
based on compliance with the decision-making tool.  
 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board does not use the specific term compliance, but 
does refer to managers being concerned more about the conduct of safety activities than with 
the content and outputs of those activities, and of an institutional faith in the efficacy of 
Òbureaucratic accountabilityÓ. 
 
ÒPrior to Challenger, the can-do culture was a result not just of years of apparently 
successful launches, but of the cultural belief that the Shuttle ProgramÕs many structures, 
rigorous procedures, and detailed system of rules were responsible for those successes.Ó 
(Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 199).  
 
The board noted that any cultural improvement after the 1986 Challenger Accident had been 
subverted by renewed faith in the changed procedures and institutions.  
 
5.3 Blindness	can	arise	when	“success”	for	the	analysis	activity	means	not	
finding	problems	
 
When a safety activity has a dual assessment / assurance role, subtle differences in context 
can switch it from an activity that primarily aims to investigate safety to an activity that 
primarily aims to demonstrate safety.   
 
Both activities may produce evidence of safety, and both may discover safety problems, but 
the difference in goals leads to different choices and interpretations. The Haddon-Cave report 
in to the Nimrod XV230 accident recommended that Òsafety casesÓ be renamed Òrisk casesÓ. 
Haddon-CaveÕs suggestion ignored the complication and confusion inherent in re-badging 
common practice, but made an important point about the relevance of language and intent for 
the probative power of safety activity. This was the same point made in the International 
Atomic Energy Agency response to Chernobyl, where they pointed out that carrying out an 
activity is not the same thing as carrying it out with the intent and willingness to find 
problems (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group 1991). 
 
One mechanism for framing ÒsuccessÓ of safety activities is through risk acceptance criteria. 
The 787-8 safety analysis was performed against strict quantitative targets. The battery fires 
incident report states that Òprobabilistic methods demonstrate compliance in the certification 
processÓ (National Transportation Safety Board 2014). Demonstration, rather than discovery, 
was the purpose of the analysis.  
 
NASA similarly maintained a safety program with a focus on demonstration. The accident 
board, referring to the pre-flight briefing slides for STS-113 stated  
 
ÒThis calculation was a sleight-of-hand effort to make the probability of bipod foam loss 
appear low rather than a serious grappling with the probability of bipod ramp foam 
separating.Ó (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 126). 
 
Even during ColumbiaÕs fatal flight, the Mission Management Team was concerned with the 
impact that the foam strike would have on the safety rationale for subsequent flights. In other 
words, foam strike was seen as a significant threat to the demonstration of safety, but not a 
threat to actual safety. A ÒsuccessfulÓ debris assessment team analysis would be one which 
addressed the threat to safety demonstration (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 
147Ð48). 
5.4 Blindness	can	stem	from	a	strong	desire	for	certainty	and	closure	
 
Media commentary on all four of the accidents has suggested a lack of interest or concern for 
safety. However, none of the subsequent investigations produced evidence that this was the 
case. On the contrary, in all four cases senior managers expressed concern about safety, and 
sought reassurance. The organisational response was to provide the assurance they sought.  
 
Whilst lithium batteries are used in many applications, their use in the main and auxiliary 
power systems of the 787-8 was novel. The Federal Aviation Administration produced nine 
Òspecial conditionsÓ for the use of the batteries. In essence, these conditions required that any 
type of battery failure must be shown to be Ònot harmfulÓ or Òextremely remoteÓ. These 
requirements are typical of civil aviation regulation in that they placed considerably more 
emphasis on the base requirement than on the means of demonstration. The FAA had strong 
concerns about the safety of the batteries, but was willing to have those concerns assuaged by 
relatively weak evidence. (National Transportation Safety Board 2014).  
 
The project office responsible for the Home Insulation Program was keen to portray a picture 
of good management and inter-departmental co-operation.  
 
ÒPerhaps this was an effort by [the assistant secretary] and others to not tell the Minister of 
the tension between the OCG and DEWHA [the government departments with co-
responsibility for the program], and to convey the impression that the Department very much 
had matters in hand. Of course, that is not what was in fact occurring.Ó (Hanger 2014, 138) 
 
Briefing notes on the project referred to a Òcomprehensive risk assessmentÓ to Òidentify and 
manage the full range of risksÓ.  
 
ÒThe Minister was not told that the Ôcomprehensive risk assessmentÕ was merely a facilitative 
process where the risks were identified by the Department and not by an engaged expertÓ 
(Hanger 2014, 141). 
 
The internal NASA briefings during the Columbia flight also tried to provide clear answers 
and reassurances.  
 
ÒEngineers who attended this briefing indicated a belief that management focused on the 
answer Ð that analysis proved there was no safety-of-flight issue Ð rather than concerns about 
the large uncertainties that may have undermined the analysis that provided that answer.Ó 
(Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 160) 
 
ÒAt the January 24, Mission Management Team meeting at which the Òno safety-of-flightÓ 
conclusion was presented, there was little engineering discussion about the assumptions 
made, and how the results would differ if other assumptions were used. Engineering solutions 
presented to management should have included a quantifiable range of uncertainty and risk 
analysis. Ò (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 168) 
 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board was particularly critical of the frequent use of 
viewgraphs (e.g. PowerPoint slides) to present overly simplistic representations of issues and 
analyses.(Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 191).  
 
On Deepwater Horizon, the team conducting the negative pressure tests invented a previously 
unknown Òbladder effectÓ that would explain the anomalous results that they were seeing. 
Believing that the tests were accurate would have overturned their previous understanding of 
the conditions of the well itself, resulting in greater confusion and uncertainty (National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011, 107). 
 
5.5 Blindness	can	stem	from	insufficient	capacity	to	perform	a	probative	
activity	
No safety technique is guaranteed to find all safety problems every time, even when applied 
competently. There is very limited evidence about the efficacy of safety analysis techniques 
(Rae, McDermid, and Alexander 2012; Rae, Nicholson, and Alexander 2010), and the 
evidence that does exist suggests highly variable results depending on who is performing the 
analysis (Amendola, Contini, and Ziomas 1992). 
 
 The prerequisites for a technique to be likely to be effective are that: 
¥ the technique is a match for the subject of the analysis, and used within its range of 
validity; 
¥ suitable information, including subject matter expertise, is available to populate the 
technique; 
¥ the technique is applied correctly; and 
¥ the results of the technique are correctly interpreted and applied.  
 
In the absence of these requirements, the output can have the format and language of a correct 
analysis, but with incorrect content. Worse, preoccupation with getting the format right, 
particularly where complicated notation is involved, can distract authors and reviewers of 
safety analysis from the substantive content.  
 
All of the case study accidents involved the use of risk assessment tools requiring specialised 
knowledge, where lack of that knowledge impeded the analysis.   
 
The Columbia Debris Assessment Team used a software modelling tool called ÒCraterÓ. The 
tool was used beyond its ability to validly predict the consequences of the foam strike. 
 
ÒAlthough Crater was designed, and certified, for a very limited set of impact events, the 
results from Crater simulations can be generated quickly. During STS-107, this led to Crater 
being used to model an event that was well outside the parameters against which it had been 
empirically validated.Ó(Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 144) 
 
As a result of a transfer of responsibilities between Boeing offices, Crater was applied and 
interpreted by staff who were unfamiliar with its use.  
 
ÒThe engineer had received formal training on Crater from senior Houston-based Boeing 
engineering staff, but he had only used the program twice before, and had reservations about 
using it to model the piece of foam debris that struck Columbia (Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board 2003, 145). 
 
The NTSB recommendations after the 787-8 battery fires cover both initial and recurrent 
training for engineers who review safety analysis (National Transportation Safety Board 
2014, 81). This recommendation was linked explicitly to findings in the report that reviewers 
had failed to identify and challenge key assumptions made in the safety documents.  
 
The report does not directly question the competence of those who performed the safety 
analysis, but describes the shortcomings in a way that reflects poorly on their analysis skills.  
 
ÒSpecifically, the analysis did not (1) identify BoeingÕs assumption that thermal runaway of a 
cell would not propagate to other cells and (2) provide the engineering rationale needed to 
justify broad use of this assumption under all operating conditions. Also, the analysis did not 
sufficiently evaluate and justify the use of the industrial battery failure rate data in predicting 
the risk of a cell venting occurrence for the 787 battery. Further, even if this information had 
been included in the EPS safety assessment, the validity of the supporting safety analyses 
would have been difficult to justify given the limited data available. (National Transportation 
Safety Board 2014, 71) 
 
The department responsible for the Home Insulation Program had difficulty even finding and 
keeping project staff.  
 
ÒDEWHA was subsequently allocated funding to undertake further design and 
implementation work, but the problem seems to have been not the funding itself, or any lack 
of it, but finding suitably qualified and experienced people to assist. [The First Assistant 
Secretary], for example, said that the level of resources (by which he seemed to mean people) 
and skill sets available were not commensurate with the tasks allocated.Ó(Hanger 2014, 82)  
5.6 Blindness	can	stem	from	separation	between	safety	activity	and	design	
or	operations	
For safety analysis to reveal problems with designs or operations, it must first accurately 
describe them. This requires that those performing the analysis work in close co-operation 
with those who know most about the system or the relevant work processes.  
 
The Home Insulation Scheme risk assessments did not incorporate expertise with electrical 
hazards, or listen to concerns raised by electrical trade practitioners.  
 
The failure to engage with the electrical trades reflected an ignorance of one of the major 
risks attendant upon working in the roof spaceÉ it is difficult to understand how a 
representative of the electrical trades was not invited to subsequent industry consultation 
meetings. No acceptable explanation was offered for this oversight. (Hanger 2014, 92) 
 
Further, as the scheme evolved, the risk register was not updated to match the changed 
arrangements. The original scheme envisaged management by a few large contractors, who 
would also handle training and certification. The final delivery model involved direct 
payments to homeowners, who could engage small businesses to perform the work. 
 
ÒThere is a real issue whether, given the change to the delivery model that occurred in April 
2009, the risk assessment was ever revised to take account of the new and different risks 
which would arise from a light touch, demand driven and direct engagement model. [The risk 
management consultantÕs] evidence was that on 28 April she was told by [a project officer] 
that the Ôbusiness model had moved on significantly since the original workshops were 
conducted and many of the original risks had become redundant or changed significantlyÕÓ 
(Hanger 2014, 145). 
 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board adopted a term coined by the earlier Roger 
Commission into the Challenger Accident, the ÒSilent Safety ProgramÓ. This referred to the 
disconnect between safety activities and operational decision making.  
 
ÒThe Debris Assessment Team, working in an essentially decentralized format, was well-led 
and had the right expertise to work the problem, but their charter was Òfuzzy,Ó and the team 
had little direct connection to the Mission Management Team. This lack of connection to the 
Mission Management Team and the Mission Evaluation Room is the single most compelling 
reason why communications were so poor during the debris assessmentÓ (Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board 2003, 180). 
 
GS Yuasa was very experienced with lithium batteries, but had limited knowledge about 
aircraft design or operations: 
 
ÒGS Yuasa did not adequately account for a number of factors that were relevant to 
propagation risk. For example, the test was not conducted at the batteryÕs maximum 
operating temperature of 158¼F, and the test setup did not fully represent the battery 
installation on the 787 airplaneÉFurther, the test was performed using a development unit 
that did not incorporate the final battery design certified as part the 787 type design.Ó 
(National Transportation Safety Board 2014, 69) 
5.7 Blindness	can	arise	when	it	is	hard	to	respond	to	any	problems	that	are	
found	
Trade-offs between efficiency and thoroughness (Hollnagel 2009) are a well understood 
source of variation in work performance, including the execution of safety tasks. The less 
time that is available to complete a task, the more emphasis shifts towards completing the task 
rather than addressing every detail.  
 
From the case studies, it is clear that thoroughness is also adversely affected if there is 
insufficient resource and time to fix any newly identified issues. The task may still be 
performed diligently, but effort is redirected towards the support of existing beliefs rather 
than discovery of new information. This is particularly the case if finding problems 
contradicts previous assurances about the integrity of the design, or causes a loss of face or 
reputation.  
 
The safety analysis is often performed once decisions about the system or operations have 
already been made, and when there would be considerable financial or reputational cost 
invoked if new safety issues were identified. It is common practice, for example, to create 
ÒretrospectiveÓ safety cases for equipment currently in service (Aas, Andersen, and 
Skramstad 2009; Eriksson 2004; Hill 2007). As the review into the Nimrod XV230 crash 
highlighted, these are often exercises in confirming institutional assumptions about safety. 
Shortly prior to the crash of XV230 in Afghanistan, the Nimrod aircraft was the subject of a 
ÒlegacyÓ safety case. This was viewed in advance as an opportunity to create structured 
evidence to support Òthe high level of corporate confidence in the safety of the Nimrod 
aircraftÓ, and with hindsight as a missed opportunity to assess the risk of an extensively 
modified and aging airframe. ÒThe problem was that those involved in producing the NSC 
[Nimrod Safety Case] embarked on the process believing the Nimrod type was safeÓ 
(Haddon-Cave 2009, 189). The focus was on demonstrating what was already ÒknownÓ, with 
less attention paid to the need to discover and communicate risk. 	
 
For the Home Insulation Program, fixed deadlines provided an incentive not to raise issues 
that would require further changes to the scheme.  
 
ÒWhat is abundantly clear from the evidence is that from the outset the 1 July 2009 
commencement date was thought to be non-negotiable by those public servants and 
consultants working on the program.Ó (Hanger 2014, 86)  
 
There were also concerns about allowing internal industry disputes to disrupt the smooth 
delivery of the program.  
 
Ò[A representative for an installation installer] believes the comments he made arose in the 
context of safety. He said that the Chairman, [the assistant secretary], discouraged 
discussion at that time. He said that [the assistant secretary] said something to the effect of 
Ôokay, we will note that and move onÕ. 
 
The Minutes do not reflect his recollection of how the meeting proceeded. He said he had 
been told not to Ôrock the boatÕ at these meetings. This was an impression he had obtained 
from [the assistant secretary], namely that he did not want internal industry disputes raised. 
It was not a comfortable situation to be in, [a representative for an installation installer] 
said, because he was Ôrocking the boatÕ. 
 
[The assistant secretary], for his part, was no doubt trying to control what was a fragmented 
and divisive industry.Ó (Hanger 2014, 94). 
 
These problems were exacerbated by the fact that the Home Insulation Program used an 
integrated risk management approach that focused primarily on political and program risks. 
Where safety was an issue it was typically viewed through the lenses of program delays and 
political fallout. Concerns such as fraud and training were raised by some participants as 
safety issues, but were understood by others to have no safety implications.  
 
ÒThe real difficulty is that [the Parliamentary Secretary] seems to have formed a view that 
participants in the HIP might act fraudulently or dishonestly, but not had an understanding 
that this might readily extend to a serious failure to adhere to their occupational health and 
safety obligations.Ó (Hanger 2014, 124) 
 
Delaying a space shuttle mission was seen as an embarrassing failure.  
 
ÒFurther, when asked by investigators why they were not more vocal about their concerns, 
Debris Assessment Team members opined that by raising contrary points of view about 
Shuttle mission safety, they would be singled out for possible ridicule by their peers and 
managers.Ó (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 169) 
 
The accident investigation board saw this as part of a pattern where deadlines placed pressure 
not just on the time available for safety activities, but on the acceptability of bad news arising 
from those activities. 
 
ÒUltimately, external expectations and pressures impact even data collection, trend analysis, 
information development, and the reporting and disposition of anomalies. These realities 
contradict NASAʼs optimistic belief that pre-flight reviews provide true safeguards against 
unacceptable hazards.Ó (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 190) 
 
Rather than being seen as evidence of diligence, newly raised safety issues were perceived as 
signs of disorganisation and ineptitude.  
 
ÒIt is here that the decision to fly before resolving the foam problem at the STS-113 Flight 
Readiness Review influences decisions made during STS-107. Having at hand a previously 
accepted rationale Ð reached just one mission ago Ð that foam strikes are not a safety-of-
flight issue provides a strong incentive for Mission managers and working engineers to use 
that same judgment for STS-107. If managers and engineers were to argue that foam strikes 
are a safety-of-flight issue, they would contradict an established consensus that was a product 
of the Shuttle ProgramÕs most rigorous review Ð a review in which many of them were active 
participants.Ó (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003, 150) 
 
The rigor of the Federal Aviation AdministrationÕs certification process created inertia that 
worked against the interests of safety. Achieving sign-off of a safety deliverable was an 
arduous and expensive process that would be ÒundoneÓ by identifying a new problem. Even 
the plan for producing the safety analysis was a pre-approved deliverable. Challenging the 
analysis would have required claiming that the analysis process Ð already agreed by all parties 
Ð was inadequate.  
 
Thus, the FAA could not effectively use traceability principles to evaluate the completeness of 
BoeingÕs proposed methods of compliance, particularly for special condition 2, which 
addressed battery thermal runaway. As a result, the FAA approved BoeingÕs proposed EPS 
certification plan, including qualification tests, for the 787 main and APU battery without the 
details necessary to demonstrate compliance with the individual special conditions. (National 
Transportation Safety Board 2014, 74) 
6 Conclusions	
This paper discusses four major accidents in depth. These are by no means the only instances 
of probative blindness identified by the authors. The history of accidents is replete with 
discussion of flawed or ignored safety analysis, and missed opportunities to identify and 
mitigate hazards.  
 
It is tempting to assume that pre-accident safety analysis is in some way exceptional Ð that 
these ÒfailedÓ safety activities are unlike other ÒnormalÓ safety activities. Unfortunately, the 
circumstances that lead to probative blindness are not exceptional. They are conditions that 
prevail in many, if not the majority of organisations working with safety critical systems. It is 
common to find any of the conditions from Figure 2: 
¥ strong prior beliefs about safety arising from operational experience or from previous 
safety analysis 
¥ transfer of concern from safety to compliance 
¥ ÒsuccessfulÓ safety framed as not finding problems 
¥ a desire for safety activities to provide certainty and closure 
¥ techniques that require specialised notation, skills or domain knowledge, with 
difficulty finding and keeping staff competent in these techniques 
¥ separation between safety activities and design or operations 
¥ safety activities conducted when there is no time or budget to respond to negative 
findings, or where there is loss of reputation associated with admitting safety 
problems 
 
If these are the circumstances that give rise to probative blindness Ð and our study strongly 
suggests that they are Ð then there is good reason to look upon any safety activity with a 
skeptical eye. Do these activities constitute a genuine search for knowledge about safety risk, 
or are they responses to regulatory, organisational and individual factors that demand 
certainty and assurance?  
 
Testing our conclusions will require extending the investigation to cover safety activities in 
the absence of accidents. Non-accident operation provides a larger and more neutral 
environment for examining safety activities, and allows direct manipulation of techniques and 
the conditions under which they are applied. It is also this environment in which explanatory 
theories of probative blindness may ultimately be applied to avoid accidents. Probative 
blindness in non-accident operation will be revealed not by the occurrence of disaster, but by 
the absence of changed belief. How often do safety activities actually result in significant 
design or operational changes? Where changed belief does occur, is it a consequence of the 
techniques that are used, the people who apply them, or the context in which they are applied? 
Is probative blindness a symptom of certain pathologies, and can they be treated? 
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